Escape%2C+evacuation+and+rescue+operations+in+the+Barents+Sea

Work Group 4 for the Barents2020 Project has identified a need for change in existing maritime and offshore oil and gas standards for escape, evacuation and rescue (EER) operations in the Barents Sea, and has proposed recommended changes in the standards.

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Photo: Prof. S. Løset

The Work Group has assessed a number of Norwegian, Russian and other international standards for maritime and offshore work typical for Barents Sea conditions. It has taken into account Russian and Norwegian experience with cold climate operations of ships in Arctic and sub-Arctic conditions, including the northern Caspian Sea and offshore Sakhalin Island. The assessment has included a review of a limited number of key recognised standards which currently contribute to the definition of the safety level for people, the environment and investments within the topics reviewed by the Work Group.

Risk identification for the Barents Sea
In the Barents Sea, as well as in other ice-covered regions of the world, a wide range of ice and weather conditions and structure-dependent factors can be seen at any particular point in time. Because of this, safe EER approaches must be capable of accommodating a full spectrum of ice or open water situations, which are often complicated by many other environmental and logistical factors.

The major EER risks which were identified by the Work Group include the following:

  • Traditional EER methods may not be appropriate for most of the year.

  • The full range of ice conditions, including icebergs and sea ice, combined with cold weather, wind and other weather conditions which may be encountered.

  • The logistics systems that may be available to support any required evacuation from the structure or vessel, including the presence of standby vessels.

  • The long distances from the potential emergency site to the support bases and other facilities.

  • The shortage of duly equipped support vessels that may be called on for assistance, with regards to their manoeuvring and station-keeping abilities in ice.

  • The accumulation of ice on external surfaces and its effect on equipment operation.

  • The limited amount of time that is available to react to a particular emergency situation.

  • The effect of cold temperatures on human physiology and psychology, equipment, materials and supplies.

  • The lack of experienced personnel and training facilities for the specific evacuation systems which have been proposed for the Barents Sea.

  • The effect of the polar night, with extended periods of darkness, on personnel activities in Arctic conditions.

  • Difficulties caused by communication due to magnetic conditions and high latitude, lack of satellite coverage and language differences.

  • The possible lack of qualified medical help.

The EER risks are closely related to the installation’s type, function, location in the Barents Sea and distance from rescue bases and resources. Hence the EER risks are, and should be, an integral part of the overall risk assessment for the installation itself.

Recommended key HSE standards
The Work Group reviewed an extended list of applicable standards and concluded that no single standard (international, Russian or Norwegian) adequately addresses HSE concerns related to EER for the Barents Sea. The Work Group decided that a certain minimum number of key standards should be identified as the standards which should possibly be “upgraded” to Barents Sea standards for use in Norway and Russia. The remaining standards to be investigated should be treated as reference documents.

The process for selecting the standards to review was discussed. The following criteria were established:

  • Best international offshore practice

  • Relevance to Barents Sea conditions

  • Relevance to general Arctic/cold climate operations

  • High level in the standards hierarchy

  • High level of satisfying functional standards

The main Norwegian and Russian standards and other international or national standards were reviewed and these documents’ compliance with the above criteria was discussed in brief. Key standards were those which covered all main EER topics and satisfied most of the issues listed. Reference standards were largely to serve as support for recommendations for change.

It was concluded that the Draft International Standard (DIS) for ISO19906 should be used as a common basis for the Work Group’s comments or recommendations. The Work Group also recommended the Canadian Offshore Petroleum Installations Escape, Evacuation and Rescue Performance-Based Standards as a valuable reference document.

The Work Group recognised and agreed that the relevant sections (Chapter 18, Appendix A18) of ISO/DIS 19906 provide appropriate general and functional guidance for EER operations in Arctic conditions. However, the standard does not provide adequate EER recommendations for the Barents Sea. It was realised, therefore, that the best way to address the Group’s findings would be to propose a separate addendum or guidance document to ISO 19906 for the Barents Sea.

General comments, findings and priorities
The EER provisions of ISO/DIS19906 are based on applying a systems approach intended to promote the successful escape from the incident, subsequent evacuation from the installation (when the incident cannot be controlled) and ultimate rescue of installation personnel. It is clear that these EER provisions should be used as part of a continuous improvement process for managing risks and the safety of personnel working offshore in Arctic and cold region environments.

The EER provisions of the ISO standard are performance based, which means that verifiable attributes or benchmarks that provide qualitative levels or quantitative measures of performance are to be achieved. The key characteristic of a performance-based standard is its focus on what is to be achieved rather than on how this should be done.

The performance target is to be the development of an EER system that incurs no additional casualties (i.e. a serious life-threatening injury or fatality resulting from an incident, including cases when emergency medical help cannot be provided) when prescribed EER methods and technical means are implemented. The performance target is developed in the context of a design health, safety and environment (HSE) case together with the relevant emergency preparedness plans. The provisions of a modified ISO/DIS19906 should be used by stakeholders, including designers and owners.

It is clearly recognised that the safe emergency evacuation of personnel from offshore structures and vessels is of critical importance in the event of a major onboard problem. In addition to the issue of specific evacuation systems and their capabilities, the question of safe evacuation also involves the procedures and training that are necessary for personnel to systematically respond in emergency situations, and a clear understanding of the range of environmental situations that may be encountered.

However, while progress is being made in HSE standards and guidelines, similar progress has not been made in the development of suitable evacuation methods and equipment in order to deal with different emergency situations in both ice and open water conditions. Although it is not commonly stated, most practitioners recognise that the majority of the evacuation systems developed to date do have some limitations, depending on the specific conditions encountered. This is particularly true for offshore structures operating in ice.

Due to Arctic conditions, special attention should be paid to the development of amphibious vehicles that are able to perform evacuation and rescue operations in open water and a variety of ice conditions (see an example of such a prototype vehicle in the attached figure). No standards for such vehicles exist and this limits the development of these vehicles. First of all, it is necessary to define operational Barents Sea conditions for new types of amphibious vehicles (including rescue operation conditions). It is also essential to clarify the requirements for stand-by and support vessels in order to verify their ability to pick up personnel from water, ice and rescue equipment.

For the most part, the existing infrastructure in the Barents Sea is not developed and does not allow adequate rescue operations. Therefore it is essential to develop technical means for supporting oil and gas activities in the Barents Sea, coastal infrastructure and mobile support bases. It is also important to establish cooperation between Russian and Norwegian authorities to develop regional standards and joint participation in EER efforts during emergency operations.

Exerpt from the Barents 2020 Final Report

Date: 05 July 2010

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