July 1st 2004 will in many ways mark a watershed in international merchant shipping. On this day, less than eight months ahead, more than 35,000 merchant ships and an estimated 20,000 port facilities worldwide must have obtained certificates stating that their operations are in accordance with the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (the ISPS Code).

The basic concept of the ISPS Code is very simple: You should not have anything onboard (crew, passengers or cargo) that you are not aware of; and the ship should be able to fend off low and middle level piracy. Part B of the Code gives guidance on how to achieve these goals, as do Notices to Mariners from Flag Authorities and IMO Circulars.
For the Port Facilities, the Code is likewise simple: You should not allow anything (cargo, ship stores, crews or workforce) that you cannot account for (and which may jeopardise the security of the terminal and the ships berthed there). As for ships, part B of the ISPS Code gives guidance on how to implement the Code in Port Facilities.
For ships, Flag Authorities may delegate the issuance of the International Ship Security Certificate (ISSC) to Recognised Security Organisations (RSO), while the security of the terminal is the sole responsibility of the Terminal Operator and the Government for the Port.
For both Ships and Port Facilities, time is now critical, as adequate time for implementation is essential.
Authorities in a number of countries have already made their intentions clear. One prominent example is the US Coast Guard. Representatives from USCG have on several occasions made it clear that ships calling into US ports will be “checked to the letter” to verify that security arrangements outlined in the Ship Security Plan and the ISPS are complied with. Thus it is not enough to produce the ISSC, it also has to be well implemented onboard. Thorough port state control, not only to verify that the certificate is onboard, must be expected. Failure to comply in practice may lead to detention or the ship being expelled from a port.
The IMO, through the Maritime Safety Committee (MSC), is preparing a Circular on ISPS Port State Control. It is expected that this Circular will be very much in line with the views advocated by USCG. What makes the ISPS certificate so different from ISM, is that any port authority can carry out inspections of the onboard implementation of the ISPS code and then decide measures to be taken if the ship does not meet requirements, even if the ship is carrying a valid certificate.
From P&I clubs, we have monitored statements saying that without a valid ISPS certificate, the insurances will not be valid. So the valid and trusted ISPS certificate will truly be a “ticket to trade”.
The bulk segment and especially the bulk port facilities are among the most security vulnerable segments of international shipping. Both reality and imagined scenarios have shown that contraband may be hidden in dry bulk cargo with some success. As examples, let me outline one threat area of concern:

• The scenario is the scuttling of one or more large iron ore carriers in one of the three major waterways: Panama, Suez or St. Lawrence, or in major ports for world trade.

Thus for global trade to be able to function in an efficient and secure way, it is important that the maritime trading community addresses the security threats that have developed. In order to achieve this goal, the security problems in the port facilities around the world must be solved. Likewise, bulk ships must implement and maintain security procedures that will effectively protect the ships, crews and cargo. And time is running out.