Since privatisation of Britain’s railways in 1994, Safety Case regulations evolved alongside the privatisation process. Rod Reid, head of Interface Risk Compliance in infrastructure owner Network Rail, explains why he views these changes as a positive way forward to align the interests of Network Rail and the operating companies when addressing the challenges facing Britain’s rail industry.
In 1994 Railtrack commenced operations as the first stage in the fragmentation and privatisation of British Rail. Aims of privatisation were to comply with EU Directives to separate infrastructure management from train operations, and also to attempt to streamline and change the way in which the UK rail system had operated. Railtrack supplied track access to some 30 train operating companies (TOCs) whilst contracting out most maintenance and renewals activities to a number of privatised infrastructure maintenance companies.
A study by the Health & Safety Commission recognised the significance of the critical technical and operating interfaces that would exist between the large number of different organisations operating on the network. It therefore recommended adopting a Safety Case approach for identifying and controlling those risks and resulted in creation of the Railways (Safety Case) Regulations 1994. These Regulations were based on a safety cascade, from the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) through Railtrack to the Train Operating Companies. There was a clearly defined process for acceptance of Railway Safety Cases, with the HSE accepting the Railtrack Safety Case, and Railtrack in turn accepting safety cases from the TOCs. Railtrack was also required to ensure TOC compliance with their safety cases by conducting an annual audit of each TOC, and monitoring their safety performance.
Regulations a barrier
Rod Reid points out that there were some problems with these arrangements. It gave Railtrack a quasi-regulatory role, and this acted as a barrier to effective cooperation with the TOCs, who were Railtracks major customers. Railtrack was required by its licence to separate the safety issues from commercial issues by creating an independent directorate, Safety and Standards Directorate, which oversaw the production of standards and also audited TOCs. However, it was always difficult to persuade external stakeholders that the Safety and Standards Directorate was completely independent of the rest of Railtrack.
Following the Ladbroke Grove and Southall Rail Accident Inquiries, the RSC Regulations 2000 were introduced. This resulted in the separation of the Directorate from Railtrack, becoming an independent company called Railway Safety. The new Regulations also effectively removed the safety cascade by requiring the HSE to accept all Railway Safety Cases, with Railtrack and Railway Safety independently assessing them and making recommendations to the HSE. Railtrack was still required to audit TOCs, but had to procure these audits from Railway Safety.
The new regulations also required a fundamental change in the content of safety cases. Up to that point, safety cases were required to describe the risks, and measures to reduce them to as low as reasonably practicable. The regulations also required a development plan, committing each company to further improvements in safety management. Each operator was also required to review its safety cases to reflect these regulations. A review of the Railtrack RSC was carried out between February 2001 and May 2002.
Continuous risk reduction
It is important that the RSC reflects the legal requirement to continuously reduce risks so far as is reasonably practicable. The new Railtrack Railway Safety Case describes the risks and their controls, and considers the effectiveness of these control measures. It also commits to actions to further improve them. This is linked closely with Railtracks annual Safety & Environment Plan, and with accident recommendations and other inputs, to provide a process of continual improvement. The development and improvement of these links will be worked on over time.
In the autumn of 2001 Railtrack plc was placed under special Administration until, on 3 October 2002, it was bought by Network Rail. Network Rail is now conducting a review of the companys processes, and one of the work streams to be reviewed is the Safety Baseline Assessment. This will review how effectively the RSC links risks, controls and future actions, and howthese relate to practices at ground level. It will also look at how effective the Safety Management System is at different levels within the company. This will result in further improvements to the RSC, the Safety and Environment Plan and company processes.
Reid sees the safety case as central to this whole process of continuous review and improvement.
He is concerned, though, that There are still problems with the current regulations, with too many layers of assessment, auditing remote from the duty holders, and aspects of a cascade within the audit process. However, there are further proposed changes to the regulations from March 2003. These will simplify the assessment process and change the method of procuring the safety case compliance audit, whereby each Operator will procure its own audit from a competent independent body.
TOCs responsible for compliance
The new audit arrangements will emphasise that the operator has primary responsibility for ensuring compliance with its own Railway Safety Case, and this will include the responsibility to procure an effective audit. Independent enforcement of compliance will be through the Health and Safety Executive. Network Rail itself will remain in a monitoring role and will review the output of audits with each TOC, focussing on implementation of actions to address issues identified by the audit. A reciprocal arrangement will allow TOCs to monitor Network Rail against its own audit action plans. The value will be in opening up the audit process to a wider market.
Rod Reid has a vision for the future in which railway safety cases will play an effective role in driving forward continuous improvement in safety. More important is a close co-operation between Network Rail and train operating companies in the development of railway safety cases, with joint monitoring of actions to improve safety.